The Detachment of Appearance, the Clinging of Reality (part 2)

Even if we are able to identify with these particular states of mind however, we still might not be convinced by the idea that appearance and reality are nothing other than ‘active strategies’. We may feel instead that the more common belief that appearance and reality are ‘concepts’ or ‘mental categories’ is much closer to our own intuition. While this point of view may be common place it is often one completely at odds with our actual practice: As we have seen, when we mediate our experiences we do not lump them into two mutually exclusive categories called ‘reality and appearance’ we freely interchange our experiences between the two – dreams, waking life, and fiction may either be real or unreal depending on our immediate requirements.

This is could be argued however, does not prove that our intuition that appearance and reality are two separate categories of experience is wrong, only that we are likely to become muddled and inconsistent when caught out by rapidly changing experience. But if the actual measure of our intuitions is our daily practice, then it seems once again that we have a position which runs counter to ourselves, since how often in practice do we find ourselves placing experience into separate mental boxes, whether consistently or otherwise? When we experience we have no time to categorise and compartmentalise experience, our choice is either to dive headfirst into the experience we are presented with, or to mentally detach ourselves from it.

To this it may be replied that even if we don’t in practice divide all our experiences into two separate piles, that we really ought to, and this is exactly why we need Philosophy to show us how. But even if such a prescription were possible to carry out in the moment, it seems we would still be missing the point of what appearance and reality are for – When we react to experience with real or illusionary intent, we do so not with the intention of being right, but for the purpose of living, and thus our behavior is not ‘inconsistent’ but ‘adaptive’.

Prima facie we might detect a faint air of ‘resigned pragmatism’ to all this, but in truth all we have really done is to describe appearance and reality as they are available to us. This does not mean that it is impossible to think of appearance and reality as two mutually exclusive concepts; in fact it is quite usual for us to do so. However if we persistently find that our abstractions do not match up with our own experience, then it is difficult to see how our concept of two exclusive things named appearance and reality is no less a thin caricature than the view that people are either “good or bad” “winners or losers”. It seems that if we are to think about appearance and reality at all, it is only by thinking about them in terms of ‘active strategies’ that we are able to arrive at a representation which both includes our own active input in their creation, and which conveys the survivalist rationale behind ‘interchanging’ them. Upon this view there is no longer even any worry about being inconsistent, since actions, unlike propositions and beliefs, are not subject to the principles that guide truth and falsehood. And thus in the same way that a door can be both opened and shut, a ball thrown and caught without implying any contradiction, so it is with our movement towards and away from experience.

  

Looming over this however is perhaps one remaining question: “What is this mysterious ‘experience’ that we are continually detaching embracing and retracting from? Is it something real, or is it unreal?” Assuming we have so far understood that appearance and reality are nothing more than activities, it should be clear that this is really to ask “do we feel moved or unmoved by it?” Any other interpretation we might be tempted to give will likely amount to a pseudo-worry over whether there is something beyond us that exists because of us, or in spite of us - a concern not only impossible to answer in practice but irrelevant to the question of how we lead our lives. If we wish to know anything about appearance and reality it seems all that is required is that we observe our own experiences. By introspecting in this way we will quickly come to know that all illusion and reality refer to is the two opposite poles of action known as expansion and contraction. Like all representations such labels are of course ‘the map’ rather than the territory itself, but if we aspire to share our experiences then it unlikely we will find a more faithful way to define them than by this active relation - a relation not only strategic, but hopefully one in which there is also the possibility of play as well.  

The Detachment of Appearence, the Clinging of Reality (part 1)

That there are two modes of experience called ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is a commonly view within philosophy, how we might distinguish appearance from reality however is often the cause of wide debate and dispute. Some philosophers in line with popular understanding have defined ‘appearance’ by that which is fleeting and transient and ‘reality’ by whatever is stable and regular, while others have found it more critical to designate appearance as that which is ‘mind-dependent’ and reality by that which is ‘mind-independent’. Such theories have rarely met with universal approval however, and many have sought to place the emphasis on direct perception instead– if I am able to make visible contact with something then it is real, otherwise I have reason to doubt it and it is not.

While these theories only constitute a small sample of the many positions available, even within this small selection alone we may find it possible to generate an entire range of conclusions starkly at odds with both convention and our intuitions. From the theory of mind-dependence for instance we may conclude that since we cannot transcend our minds to verify which entities are truly real or ‘mind-independent’ we may as well assume all phenomena are illusions contingent upon the mind. In this way rather than distribute experience between appearance and reality, sometimes it may seem more plausible to consign experience in its entirety to either one.

No matter whether we claim experience is ‘all appearance’ ‘all reality’ or a mixture of both however, the true test of such theories is often not how internally consistent or resistant to attack they are, but how resilient they are to everyday life. Unfortunately when we do test our intellectual virtues against the chaotic barrage of everyday life we may often find our closely cherished theories are impossible to live up to – in practice life not only demands to be split between both reality and appearance, but also that both categories are inter-changeable. While the idea of inter-substituting reality and appearance in this way might strike us as inconsistent and contradictory, such flexibility is often essential to our survival and fulfillment in life.
  

For example; even though I may 'know' that fictional books are just made up stories to entertain people, it is may also be necessary for the purpose of enjoying them that I am able to take the characters to be every bit as my family and friends. Similarly, while it is essential in order to scare myself with nightmares that I suspend disbelief in order to enjoy them, it is equally as essential that I am able to tell myself that they weren't real when I wake up. Although even when I wake up, reality may still prove just as frightening as my dreams, and so in this case I must calmly remind myself that this is only the subtle illusion created by billions of atoms dancing together, creating the collaborative fiction of ‘solid matter’.

If any of these examples offer an honest reflection of ordinary experience, then it seems that to find something ‘real’ is to do no more than embrace an experience, while to find something ‘unreal’ is to retract from it. While it may seem contradictory and irrational to react to our experiences as both real and unreal depending on our whims, if we understand appearance and reality as active movements of the mind toward and away from experience, then it should be apparent that to find something both ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ on separate occasions is no more contradictory than to both climb a ladder and descend it, to rise from a bed and later lie down in it.
  

As a tradition largely build upon the foundations of rational discourse rather than self-observation, the idea that appearance and reality might be nothing over and above the mind’s grasping and releasing of experience probably seems counter-intuitive. It is perhaps only in the Eastern tradition where introspection or ‘mindfulness’ is typically given priority over verbal discourse that we are likely to find practitioners more easily accustomed to the idea of appearance as “detachment” while reality as “clinging”. Even if such a view is relatively lost to western philosophy however, we may still find traces of the same basic intuition within our everyday speech. It is quite common for instance to hear people say of someone who is mentally ill: “That man doesn't have a firm grip on reality” “he’s taken leave of his senses!” “He isn't in possession of his mind”. Similarly if someone is regarded as sane, we are usually reassured that they are “in full possession of their senses” or have a “firm grip on reality”.

From these examples it should be apparent that appearance and reality are not only playful activities of the mind as relates with experience, but also important coping strategies we unconsciously employ to mediate it - Sometimes experience may prove desirable and of benefit and we will instinctively embrace them, other times experience may appear threatening and confusing and it will become more desirable to disengage from them. The mental patient is particularly adept at this second type of strategy, and may even be regarded as ‘sane’ in as much as he is able to demonstrate that he still has enough survival instinct to detach himself from socially standardised experiences which have long ceased to be bearable for him. While we probably do not regard ourselves as having quite such a loose grasp on reality as this, we can perhaps recognise something of own behavior in this form of detachment, and in turn appreciate how difficult ordinary experience must have become in order for someone to take such drastic action.

Go to part 2