That there are two modes of experience called ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’ is a commonly view within philosophy, how we might distinguish appearance from reality however is often the cause of wide debate and dispute. Some philosophers in line with popular understanding have defined ‘appearance’ by that which is fleeting and transient and ‘reality’ by whatever is stable and regular, while others have found it more critical to designate appearance as that which is ‘mind-dependent’ and reality by that which is ‘mind-independent’. Such theories have rarely met with universal approval however, and many have sought to place the emphasis on direct perception instead– if I am able to make visible contact with something then it is real, otherwise I have reason to doubt it and it is not.
While these theories only constitute a small sample of the many positions available, even within this small selection alone we may find it possible to generate an entire range of conclusions starkly at odds with both convention and our intuitions. From the theory of mind-dependence for instance we may conclude that since we cannot transcend our minds to verify which entities are truly real or ‘mind-independent’ we may as well assume all phenomena are illusions contingent upon the mind. In this way rather than distribute experience between appearance and reality, sometimes it may seem more plausible to consign experience in its entirety to either one.
No matter whether we claim experience is ‘all appearance’ ‘all reality’ or a mixture of both however, the true test of such theories is often not how internally consistent or resistant to attack they are, but how resilient they are to everyday life. Unfortunately when we do test our intellectual virtues against the chaotic barrage of everyday life we may often find our closely cherished theories are impossible to live up to – in practice life not only demands to be split between both reality and appearance, but also that both categories are inter-changeable. While the idea of inter-substituting reality and appearance in this way might strike us as inconsistent and contradictory, such flexibility is often essential to our survival and fulfillment in life.
For example; even though I may 'know' that fictional books are just made up stories to entertain people, it is may also be necessary for the purpose of enjoying them that I am able to take the characters to be every bit as my family and friends. Similarly, while it is essential in order to scare myself with nightmares that I suspend disbelief in order to enjoy them, it is equally as essential that I am able to tell myself that they weren't real when I wake up. Although even when I wake up, reality may still prove just as frightening as my dreams, and so in this case I must calmly remind myself that this is only the subtle illusion created by billions of atoms dancing together, creating the collaborative fiction of ‘solid matter’.
If any of these examples offer an honest reflection of ordinary experience, then it seems that to find something ‘real’ is to do no more than embrace an experience, while to find something ‘unreal’ is to retract from it. While it may seem contradictory and irrational to react to our experiences as both real and unreal depending on our whims, if we understand appearance and reality as active movements of the mind toward and away from experience, then it should be apparent that to find something both ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ on separate occasions is no more contradictory than to both climb a ladder and descend it, to rise from a bed and later lie down in it.
As a tradition largely build upon the foundations of rational discourse rather than self-observation, the idea that appearance and reality might be nothing over and above the mind’s grasping and releasing of experience probably seems counter-intuitive. It is perhaps only in the Eastern tradition where introspection or ‘mindfulness’ is typically given priority over verbal discourse that we are likely to find practitioners more easily accustomed to the idea of appearance as “detachment” while reality as “clinging”. Even if such a view is relatively lost to western philosophy however, we may still find traces of the same basic intuition within our everyday speech. It is quite common for instance to hear people say of someone who is mentally ill: “That man doesn't have a firm grip on reality” “he’s taken leave of his senses!” “He isn't in possession of his mind”. Similarly if someone is regarded as sane, we are usually reassured that they are “in full possession of their senses” or have a “firm grip on reality”.
From these examples it should be apparent that appearance and reality are not only playful activities of the mind as relates with experience, but also important coping strategies we unconsciously employ to mediate it - Sometimes experience may prove desirable and of benefit and we will instinctively embrace them, other times experience may appear threatening and confusing and it will become more desirable to disengage from them. The mental patient is particularly adept at this second type of strategy, and may even be regarded as ‘sane’ in as much as he is able to demonstrate that he still has enough survival instinct to detach himself from socially standardised experiences which have long ceased to be bearable for him. While we probably do not regard ourselves as having quite such a loose grasp on reality as this, we can perhaps recognise something of own behavior in this form of detachment, and in turn appreciate how difficult ordinary experience must have become in order for someone to take such drastic action.
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